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1  Introduction 
Companies have been urged to reinvent and innovate their business model due to continuously 
increasing business complexity and technological advances (Chesbrough 2010), which leads to 
shortened lifecycles of products, companies and industries. In this context, business models 
were assigned a critical role. In fact, superior business models became the source of hard-to-
imitate competitive advantages. By adopting superior business models, companies are not only 
able to explore, exploit and sustain potential competitive advantages (Barney, 1991), but also 
to create shareholder value (Rappaport, 1987). Thus, corporate strategy, business models and 
shareholder value intersect in the processes of identifying, selecting and evaluating superior 
business models. As a consequence, one of the most urgent questions companies raise is how 
to differentiate themselves in an intensely competitive landscape. Thus, the research question 
of this master thesis is: ‘How can companies identify, select and establish a viable and 
superior business model in nowadays dynamic and ever-changing business environment?’ 
The first part will introduce the current literature on business models and shareholder value. 
The second part, the case study of the real world example Rocket Internet (RI), illustrates RI’s 
complex process of identifying, selecting, innovating and sustaining a superior business model 
in a particularly competitive environment, the Information Technology (IT) sphere. The case 
study presents RI at a turning point: RI can either continuously reinvent its business model and 
convince investors that it is able to generate shareholder value or RI will experience a further 
share price plunge. 
This master thesis contributes to students´ theoretical and practical understanding of business 
models and their application in a real world example. In doing so, theoretical groundings of 
business models, strategy and shareholder value research are presented in a comprehensively 
and structured manner. Students are encouraged to apply these theoretical groundings in the 
interdisciplinary case study (strategic management and corporate finance) of the real world 
example of RI. As a result, students´ understanding of these terms in general, and of their 
differentiation and interplay, is improved. Furthermore, the combination of literature review 
and case study further sharpens students’ understanding of strategic decision making in respect 
to business models and their impact on a company’s financial performance. Thereby, this case 
study introduces a particularly interesting company example to students, as it examines a very 
fast paced industry and a controversially discussed company. Last but not least, this case study 
  5 
might encourage to conduct further research of business models in the intersection between 
strategic management and corporate finance. 
 
Both the literature review and case study apply strategic management and corporate finance 
related theories and tools to be able to identify, select and evaluate a superior business model. 
Business model concepts are reviewed from perspectives of IT based, structural, and strategic 
conceptualizations. These theories are complemented and linked to the shareholder value 
theory, in order to address the research question of this master thesis. 
  
This master thesis is divided into three parts: Literature Review, Case Study, and Teaching 
Note. The literature review analyses the academic research bodies of corporate finance and 
strategy by applying a systematic literature review (see Appendix 1). The case study part 
includes industry and equity research reports regarding the internet industry and RI itself, 
company research, and databases (e.g. Reuters, Bloomberg, S&P Capital IQ). Furthermore, this 
case study is based on publicly accessible data and information, which is complemented with 
interviews of RI employees. 
 
2 Literature Review: Business model 
This section includes the theoretical basis for business models as well as strategic concepts and 
the linkage to shareholder value, which is considered a financial measure to evaluate (superior) 
business models.  
2.1 Origin and evolution 
In the time span from 1965 to 2013, 2,823 peer-reviewed journals using the business model 
term have been published, while most of these journals were published in the 2000s or later. 
However, there is only a very limited body of well-known and renowned academic research 
(Amit & Zott, 2001; Nelson, 1991; Teece, 2009; Zott & Amit, 2008; Zott, Amit, & Massa, 
2011), as the vast majority of academic research stems from publications in minor ranked peer-
reviewed academic journal as well as non-academic business related guides and books (Afuah 
& Tucci, 2001; Magretta, 2002; Wiley et al., 2011). As a consequence, the theoretical 
underpinnings remain thin, although the business model term has increasingly gained academic 
attention. The vast majority of business model research deals with conceptualizations, while 
the minor part follows an empirical research design (Lambert & Davidson, 2013). Regarding 
the peer-reviewed journals, the origin and evolution of the business model term was covered 
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by mainly three research strings: (i) IT based conceptualizations, (ii) structural 
conceptualizations, and (iii) strategic conceptualizations (Wirtz et al., 2016). In this respect, the 
historical developments of the business model term within the academic community can be 
summarized into three main phases (see Appendix 2).  
 
First, the early stage phase, from 1957 – 1994, is a less intensively researched phase and 
describes the business model term’s origin. In academic research, the business model term 
occurred for the first time around 1960 and was developed for so called business games 
(Bellman et al. 1957; Jones 1960). These business games were applied to practice managers’ 
leading skills. Bellman et al. (1957) emphasized the complexity: ‘We must ﬁrst construct a 
mathematical model, then construct a simulation process based upon it. And many more 
problems arise to plague us in the construction of these business models […]’. The following 
time span from 1970 until the mid 1990s was characterized by a low number of published peer-
reviewed academic journals on business models (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci 2005).  
 
Second, the phase of IT based conceptualizations, from 1995 – 2002, outlines the increased 
momentum of research in the IT sphere. In the dot-com era, business models were 
predominantly used by investors to validate and explain both how business is done and how 
future cash flows of IT based companies are intended to be generated (Zott, Amit, & Massa 
2011). This is due to the fact that internet companies emerged as entirely new companies so 
that they could not be compared to precedent or existing comparable companies (Thornton & 
Marche 2003). Zott et al. 2011 further claim, that IT based business models were a means to 
explain how companies did business based on the internet and how IT was used in this respect. 
Compared to the early stage phase, the business model term developed from a tool to improve 
managerial skills into an instrument for investors to examine business activity and cash flows. 
 
Third, the differentiation phase, from 2003 – 2013, describes the shift of academic research 
towards strategy and structural conceptualizations based studies. After the bursting of the dot-
com bubble in 2001, the academic research of business models shifted towards a more generic 
point of view (Wirtz et al., 2016). This transition from 2004 to 2007 was characterized by a 
stable number of academic publications (around 30 research papers each year). As the generic 
research stream picked up speed from 2008 to 2010, the number of publications did as well - 
45 research papers were published in 2008, 68 in 2009 and 83 in 2010 (DaSilva & Trkman, 
2014). Compared to the two preceding phases, the term business model developed from a 
managerial and investor instrument into a buzzword to analyze and explain a broad spectrum 
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of organizations´ business models (e.g. UK Labour Party) and industries (e.g. airline, music 
etc.) account for this diversity and claim, that business models are connected to corporate 
business concepts and revenue model (DaSilva & Trkman, 2014; Ghaziani & Ventresca, 2005). 
 
Concluding, research on business models developed due to consistently high interest by both 
practitioners and scholars, including various perspectives and definitions. This is in line with 
the tendency that the boundaries of the research angles of business models increasingly blur, 
resulting in broad definitions and characterizations (Wirtz et al. 2016). 
 
2.2 Methodology 
Using the business model term as a buzzword, it is no surprise there is no agreement on a 
commonly accepted definition (Scott et al., 2005; Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011). Instead, a variety 
of not always consistent definitions and component breakdowns of business models exists, 
which often only partially capture the business model term. As a result, there are more than ten 
different approaches of strategic scholars to characterize business models, ranging from a 
simple description to associating the business model term to a concept, manner or dynamic 
process (Al-Debei & Avison, 2010; Bower, 1996; Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005) (see 
Table 1). Not surprisingly, business model conceptualizations are still perceived as an ill-
defined ‘buzzword’ within the academic community.  
 
Table 1: Characterizations of business model definitions from 2000 since to date 
 
Own illustration based on (Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011) 
Business model definition Academic Literature 
Architecture Dubosson-Torbay et al. (2002); Timmers (1998) 
Concept / model George and Bock (2009); Osterwalder (2004); Osterwalder et al. (2005) 
Construct  Amit and Zott (2001) 
Description Applegate (2000); Weil and Vitale (2001) 
Dynamic Process Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2013) 
Framework Afuah (2004) 
Manner Teece (2009) 
Method Afuah and Tucci (2001); Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) 
Pattern Brousseau and Penard (2006) 
Set Seelos and Mair (2007) 
Statement Stewart and Zhao (2000) 
System Zott, Amit, & Massa (2011) 
Representation Morris et al. (2005); Shafer et al. (2005) 
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Despite various definitions, common ground in academic research could be established by 
agreeing on business models as a corporate instrument to both create and to capture value 
(Aspara et al., 2013; Teece 2010; Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011). For instance, Amit & Zott (2001) 
emphasize the importance of a business model’s construct by defining it as ‘the design of 
transaction content, structure, and governance so as to create value through the exploitation 
of business opportunities’. This view is complemented by the definition of Teece (2009), which 
emphasizes ‘the architecture of revenues, costs, and profits associated with the business 
enterprise delivering that value’. Furthermore, Teece (2009) points out that business models 
can also be understood as recipes (see ‘Rocket Recipe’ in Case Study), which are practical 
models of technology not only open for copying, but also for variation and innovation (DaSilva 
& Trkman, 2014). Most recent definitions such as the one of Zott, Amit, & Massa (2011) focus 
on the aspect of reducing the complexity of business model definitions, by broadly defining the 
business model term. According to their view, a company’s business model should be perceived 
as ‘a system of interdependent activities that transcends the focal firm and spans its 
boundaries’.  
 
To conclude, the academic community is still widely dispersed. Thus, there is a variety of 
conceptual and content-wise definitions, which only partially capture the characteristics of 
business models. Even though a common ground has been established in terms of the strategic 
goals of business models (e.g. create and capture value), Zott et al. (2011) claim that academic 
research has to agree on a commonly accepted definition of business models in the first place 
to be able to agree on the theoretical underpinnings of business models.  
 
2.3 IT based conceptualizations 
The perspective from the IT sphere has become a catalyst for general academic research of 
business models. During the 1990s, research on IT picked up speed (see Appendix 2) and the 
focus of the academic discussion soon was on the value creation potential of internet companies 
(Amit & Zott, 2001; Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
 
Academic research began to examine the business model term from the 1990s onwards (Shafer 
et al., 2005: 200), while it was simultaneously used by internet companies by pitching the 
business ventures as attractive investment opportunities to attract more funding. In this respect, 
business models were used to explain and justify the enormous growth potential and enterprise 
valuations of the internet companies at that time. Since academic scholars struggled to find a 
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commonly accepted definition of the business model term, they outlined alternative business 
models. To explain their value creation potential, Rappa (2004) and Timmers (1998) proposed 
different types of IT based business models according to their level of innovation and 
functionality, which is one of the most prominent approaches. However, Amit & Zott (2001) 
claim that neither the research disciplines of strategic management nor entrepreneurship are 
able to fully capture the specific value creation potential of internet companies. Thus, Amit & 
Zott (2001) suggested four specific drivers of value creation in the respect of IT based business 
models of internet companies: (i) Novelty, (ii) Lock-In, (iii) Complementarities, and (iv) 
Transaction efficiency. 
(i) Novelty 
Novelty refers to business models that structure or bundle new or existing products, services, 
transactions and information. Virtual markets provide IT based companies with an ideal 
environment to innovate business models, which also supports the process of establishing first-
mover advantages such as building reputation and brand awareness (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). For instance, eBay enabled and facilitated bilateral auctions for goods 
from low to high value-items. 
(ii) Lock in 
Lock-In or customer loyalty refers to the extent to which the business model is able to motivate 
customers to engage in transactions and also improve the customer retention by providing 
incentives, and enhance transaction frequency and value creation. Most common incentives 
compromise loyalty programs, trustful customer relationships or virtual communities (Hagel, 
1999; Teece, 1987).  
(iii)  Complementarities 
Complementarities exist whenever the combination of goods create more value than the sum of 
the parts (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). IT based companies frequently use 
complementarities to enhance their core product by offering additional directly related service 
to customers, to unleash hidden value and obtain a higher value creation, for example, after-
sales services or one-stop-shopping solutions.  
(iv) Transaction efficiency 
Transaction efficiency increases when transaction costs decrease by reducing information 
asymmetries between buyers and sellers (Soto-Acosta & Meroño-Cerdan, 2008). Following 
Amit & Zott (2001), this process may lead to the creation of entirely new business models (Dyer 
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& Singh, 1998). Bottom line, the greater the degree of transaction efficiency of IT based 
companies, the more costs are decreased and the more value can be created.  
Assuming interdependencies between these sources, their combination leads to even more 
powerful and diversified value creation potentials. This combination of value creation sources 
can be translated into nine basic categories of IT based business models (see Table 2) which 
are linked to existing companies´ business models (Newbert, 2007; Rappa, 2004; Timmers, 
1998).  
 
Table 2: Overview of IT based business models 
Own illustration based on (Newbert, 2007; Rappa, 2004; Timmers, 1998) 
 
To conclude, business models can be seen as the conceptual link between strategy, business 
organization and systems.  
 
2.4 Structural conceptualizations 
In comparison with the IT and strategy literatures, conceptualizations play a rather subordinate 
role. As companies tend to frequently and repeatedly combine value creation drivers (see 2.5.1
 Value creation) for establishing business models, academic literature structured these 
business model patterns according to their level of conceptualizations (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 
2010). In this respect, business model patterns can be understood as ‘building blocks’, which 
share similar characteristics or behaviors, and are structured into three categories: (i) meta-
models (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011), (ii) sub-meta-models, and (iii) 
particular real world companies (Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen 2005). The three categories 
IT based business models Description Example 
Brokerage models Facilitation of Transaction Skyscanner 
Advertising models Generating advertisement fees Yahoo 
Infomediary models Collecting personal data Facebook 
Merchant models Enabling retailers to sell products online eBay 
Manufacturing models 




Affiliate is paid a commission fee by 
click-through purchases  
Social Media Links to brokerage 
or merchant models 
Community models 
Users to invest in developing 
relationships with members of a 
community 
LinkedIn Premium 
Subscription models Recurring subscription fees Netflix, Hello Fresh 
Utility models Paying for services consumed Pay as You Go 
 
  11 
provide most value, when hierarchically linked to each other, from meta models, to sub-meta-
models, to real world companies (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005).  
(i) Meta-models 
Meta models associate business models to an overarching concept. This concept can be 
transferred to any real world company and thus functions as the basis for the three levels of 
conceptualization. Definitions by Timmers (1998) and Zott et al. (2011) broadly outline the 
idea of what a business model deals with (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005). Osterwalder, 
et al. (2005) claim business models to be ‘the translation of strategic issues, such as strategic 
positioning and strategic goals into a conceptual model that explicitly states how the business 
functions’ . This view is complemented by business models’ strengths, drawing attention to the 
fitting of a company’s pieces and creating value (Magretta; 2002). Scholars like Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom (2002) and Johnson, Christensen, & Kagermann (2008) normatively define the 
single components (e.g. value propositions, key processes and key resources) of a business 
model and provide respective guidance and limitations of the selection of a business model’s 
components.  
(ii) Sub-meta-models 
In comparison with meta-models, sub-meta-models do not describe any real world company. 
Instead, they rather outline a specific set of businesses with common characteristics (Rappa, 
2004; Timmers, 1998). Most academic and practical attempts to describe and classify business 
models have been taxonomies, which usually are established by abstracting from observations, 
typically by single industries (Baden-Fuller & Mangematin, 2013). Baden-Fuller & 
Mangematin (2013) suggest a typology that considers four elements, e.g. the characteristics that 
define the business model: Customer identification, value proposition, monetization (Teece 
2010) and Value chain and linkages (Amit & Zott, 2001; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010). 
This four-dimensional typology is offered as a valuable insight, because it provides a set of 
clear and alternative types of models.  
(iii) Real world companies 
Real world companies are the bottom-up approach to the business model conceptualization. In 
fact, they consist of company-specific business models and/or their very basic descriptions, 
representations and conceptualizations. Several authors used a business model perspective to 
analyze companies, such as IKEA (Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005), Xerox (Chesbrough 
& Rosenbloom, 2002) and Ryanair (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010).  
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2.5 Strategic conceptualizations 
The most advanced and important stream of academic literature regarding business models 
stems from strategic conceptualizations and consists of three research strings: (i) value creation, 
(ii) distinction between the business model and other strategy concepts and (iii) relationship 
between business models and company performance (Zott et al., 2011). The vast majority of 
research emphasizes the aspects of value creation by focusing on a company’s activity centered 
on the customer needs.  
2.5.1 Value creation 
A business model can create value through the configuration of the value chain, the formation 
of strategic networks among companies (Dyer & Singh, 1998), or the exploitation of company-
specific core competencies (Barney, 1991). From a company’s perspective, value creation 
includes exceeding competitors’ ability to provide solutions to customers’ needs, as well as 
maintaining or improving own profit margins (Barney, 1991). A company establishes a 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), once it implements a value creating strategy based on 
its business model, which is not simultaneously implemented by any current or potential 
competitor. 
2.5.2 Distinction with other strategy concepts 
It has been proven difficult to clearly distinguish between the business model and the strategy 
it is based on (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Onetti et al., 2012). Possible reasons may stem 
from the short period of academic research, the inclusion of various perspectives and its 
function as an interlayer between business strategy and business processes (Osterwalder, 
Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005; Scott et al., 2005). As a consequence, the buzzword business model 
developed a degree of uncertainty, and confusion regarding the distinction of strategy and 
business model notions emerged. 
Since 2000, prominent scholars, e.g. Onetti et al. (2012), Osterwalder et al. (2005), suggest a 
distinction between the terms of business model and strategy in order to significantly improve 
the understanding of the term business model. There are two main characteristics that distinct 
business model from strategy. First, the scope. Business models are perceived as systems, that 
illustrate how the different parts of business concepts fit together (Osterwalder, Pigneur, and 
Tucci 2005). Strategy, however, additionally considers aspects of competition and 
implementation. Second, the observability. Porter & Millar (1985) point out that not every 
company, which operates a business model, also has a strategy in place. Furthermore they claim 
that business models are observable while strategies are not always fully observable so that a 
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company’s business model is also considered as the reflection of its implemented strategy.  
2.5.3 Relationship with company performance 
Since its early days the strategic management research body addresses various attributes to 
companies’ competitiveness. In this respect, three important drivers of companies’ performance 
are (i) the overall corporate strategy (Peteraf, 1993), (ii) resources & capabilities (Eisenhardt, 
2000; Wernerfelt, 1984), and (iii) core competencies (Prahalad, 1993). However, research 
considers sources of competitive advantages from various angles. On the one hand, Reed and 
DeFillippi (1990) consider corporate strategy a potential source of competitive advantage. On 
the other hand, Afuah & Tucci (2001) and Brandenburger & Stuart (2005) explain a business 
model as a unifying construct for explaining competitive advantage and company performance. 
Furthermore, some research considers business models to be the source of competitive 
advantages, referred to as superior business models (Christensen, Craig, & Hart, 2001; 
Markides & Charitou, 2004). Additionally, a superior business model is not only suggested to 
be a source for competitive advantage but to be an instrument to create shareholder value 
(Rappaport, 1987). Thus, shareholder value, which can be quantified by company performance 
measurements, can be used as tool to evaluate business models in general, and to identify 
superior business models in particular. 
 
2.6 Shareholder value 
2.6.1 Origin and evolution 
Defining shareholder value, common ground has been established by agreeing on a commonly 
accepted conceptualization. In fact, the definition of shareholder value stems from a practical 
guide (Porter & Kramer, 2011) due to its practical relevance. Shareholder value is created ‘from 
policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while 
simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities, in which it 
operates’. Shareholder value was associated with superior performance, expressed by the rate 
of return on corporate stocks (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1976). In this respect, the body of 
strategic management focused on conducting event studies to quantify the impact of strategic 
decision making on shareholder value, e.g. announcements of R&D expenses (Kelm, 
Narayanan & Pinches, 1995), M&A activities (Chatterjee, 1986; Chatterjee et al., 1992), and 
capital expenditures (McConnell & Muscarella, 1985). Building on these research papers, the 
most frequently cited papers on shareholder value (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998) evolved around the 2000s. They served 
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as catalysts for practical guides regarding the implementation of shareholder value (Day & 
Fahey, 1990; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Rappaport, 2006) and were followed by research from 
the marketing perspective on drivers of shareholder value.  
2.6.2  Measurement 
Looking at the link between business models and shareholder value, only a limited number of 
peer-reviewed academic journals examines this interplay. Rappaport (1987) limits the main 
driver of shareholder value to seven factors, e.g. growth in sales, margins, working capital and 
fixed capital, which are complemented by the tax rate, the cost of capital, and the competitive 
advantage period. The following part introduces two main categories of performance 
measurements of shareholder value: (i) accounting based and (ii) market based metrics. It is 
worth mentioning that their application significantly varies for traditional and IT based 
companies. 
(i) Accounting based metrics 
Accounting based metrics include ratios such as return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) 
and return on invested capital (ROIC). However, the academic community concludes that these 
metrics are not ideal for measuring shareholder value (Rappaport, 1987). The main flaws arise 
from reflecting historic company performance and being short term related (Hillman & Keim, 
2001). Furthermore, accounting metrics are not able to capture intangible assets such as a 
company’s reputation or a company’s intellectual property (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; Hillman & Keim, 2001) and can be easily adjusted and manipulated by the companies´ 
publishing reports (Fisher & McGowan, 1983). 
(ii) Market based metrics 
Compared to accounting based metrics, market based metrics benefit from their ability to take 
into account future developments of both the company’s future cash flow generation and the 
company’s future level of risk (Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998). In the following the most 
relevant market based metrics are discussed, which include Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and 
Net Present Value (NPV), Tobin’s Q, Market Value Added (MVA), Cash Flow Return on 
Investment (CFROI), and Total Shareholder Return (TSR) approach (see Appendix 3). 
 
Copeland & Galai (1983) claim the Net Present Value (NPV) to be beneficial in terms of 
investment decisions. Based on the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model, the value of the 
operations of a business (NPV) is determined by discounting expected future operating free 
cash flows at a risk adjusted cost of capital.  
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Another market-based metrics is Tobin’s Q (Brainard & Tobin, 1968), which is obtained by 
dividing the company’s market value by the company’s replacement costs. However, both the 
DCF model approach and the Tobin’s Q metrics have flaws inherent: subjectivity for estimating 
future cash flows and discount rates, and the difficulty to value intangible assets, respectively. 
The MVA approach eliminates these flaws (Hillman & Keim, 2001). The MVA approach uses 
the underlying concept of the internal rate of return by performing iterative calculations for 
determining the required discount rate, which offsets the sum of the present value of all cash 
flows with the present value of the investment (Hillman & Keim, 2001). In this model, a 
company’s net income is taken as a proxy for the cash flow and is equally distributed over the 
respective time periods and therefore constant. This is essential, because it ensures the 
comparison of actual return and cost of capital. If the return exceeds the cost of capital, 
shareholder value is created. Thus, in academic research, the MVA approach is frequently used 
and cited for measuring the shareholder value, at least for traditional business models.  
 
The CFROI expresses the mean return of companies’ projects. If this rate of return exceeds the 
weighted accumulated costs of capital without inflation (WACC), the positive difference 
quantifies the level of shareholder value created (Fernández, 2002; Lewis & Lehmann, 1992). 
As a consequence, among practitioners the CFROI concept is perceived as an extension of the 
ROA, as it also considers the cost of capital. Following the concept of CFROI, the TSR extends 
ROE, which only considers the return of shareholders (Fernández, 2002). If this rate of return 
exceeds the cost of equity, the positive difference quantifies the level of shareholder value 
created. 
Concluding, measurements of shareholder value are different for traditional and IT based 
businesses. Even though market based metrics gained more academic and practical interest due 
to their comprehensive consideration of companies’ performance (e.g. forward looking 
character in form of cash flow calculation), these conclusions do not apply for IT based 
companies. Usually IT based companies tend to have high growth rates in sales and market 
penetration, while having negative earnings, few tangible assets, and sometimes low (even 
negative) book values (Zott & Amit, 2007). Thus, market based metrics for measuring 
shareholder value are not ideal, as market capitalization is associated with the uncertainty of 
the true companies’ prospects (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Furthermore, real options as 
alternative measurement for shareholder value of IT based companies are subject of discussion 
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within the academic research band of corporate finance, but tend to be prone to large model 
errors (Amram, 2000). To conclude, it is challenging to value IT based companies (Goldenberg 
& Goldenberg, 2009). However, best practice approaches, derived from investment banks and 
consultancy firms, suggest to start with comprehensively understanding the internet companies’ 
value propositions, then projecting revenues, followed by projecting profitability 
measurements. These two steps are encouraged to be cross checked by comparing them to 
similar companies resulting in a weighted scenario analysis, which incorporates industry trends 
and economic drivers to make projections and valuations more realistic. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Concluding, this literature review explores areas of corporate strategy, business models and 
shareholder value to provide a theoretical basis on how these three intersect in the process of 
identifying, selecting and evaluating superior business models. Reviewing business models 
conceptualizations from IT, structural and strategic perspectives, it can be affirmed that 
academic interest in the business model term has gained momentum. Even though the business 
model term experienced various definitions, research aligns on the idea of superior business 
models as a source of competitive advantage. However, research only considers the context of 
technological advancements and how the traditional business model view can be shifted 
towards an embedded view considering the intersection of strategy and shareholder value. 
Therefore, the aim of this master thesis is contributing to fill this research gap by applying a 
case study with a real world example to deliver insights and inspirations for bridging strategy, 
business models and corporate finance aspects in a dynamic business environment.  
For future avenues of academic research, it would offer value to develop and establish a 
commonly accepted definition of business models first. This might foster conceptual and 
particularly empirical research because data sourcing would be simplified and facilitated. On 
this basis, further light should be shed on a more comprehensive approach of integrating 
corporate finance, strategy and business models aspects. By doing so, both practitioners and 
scholars would contribute practically and theoretically to finally close this research gap. 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: Process of systematic literature review 
 
Description Number of identified papers Databases 
Step 1 
Three major databases were chosen for peer-reviewed 
academic journals (preferably, Strategic Management 
Journal, Journal of Management, Academy of 
Management Journal and Journal of Finance). The 






 Web of Science 
Step 2 
Initial screening of existing academic papers 
according to commonalities regarding key words in 
abstracts, title or main body of these papers. 
76  Mendeley 
Step 3 
Additional studies were found through new search 
strategies considering linkages between strategy, 
business models and shareholder value. 
81 
 EBSCO 
 Google Scholar 
Step 4 
Identification of most important academic papers 
according to the quantity of citations and the VHB-
ranking of peer-reviewed academic journals. 
29  VHB database 
Step 5 
Consolidation of results through retrospective and 
forward related search approach by following the 
citations. 
31  Google Scholar 
Step 6  
Final selection of peer-reviewed academic papers and 
complementing academic literature. 
31  Mendeley 
 
Source: Own representation based on (Burns & Grove, 1993) 
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Appendix 2: Literature overview of business model term 
 
Source: Own illustration based on (Amit & Zott, 2001; Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Wirtz et al., 2016; Zott & Amit, 2008) 
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Appendix 3: Overview of shareholder value measurement metric 
 Calculation 
Accounting based metrics  
ROA 




𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥






Market based metrics  
Tobin’s Q 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
 
MVA Market value of company – Invested capital 
CFROI 








Source: Own illustration based on (Fernández, 2002; Firer, 1995; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Reilly & Brown, 2003)
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Abstract 
This case study addresses the increasing importance of 
business models in nowadays business environment, 
characterized by technological advances and the dynamic 
competitive landscape. Particularly interesting, this case study 
considers the interplay of strategic management and corporate 
finance aspects using the real world example of Rocket 
Internet (RI), an IT based incubation and investment company. 
RI’s turbulent company history of quickly becoming a 
unicorn, its IPO and its downturn will be analyzed and 
connected to RI’s management of its unique business model. 
Negative investor sentiment evolved due to profitability 
issues, lack of transparency, communication and shareholder 
value. RI’s future path is closely connected to its business 
model. RI has to reinvent and innovate its business model, but 
for that investors’ time and patience is required. 
 
O presente estudo de caso aborda a crescente importância dos 
modelos de negócio na atual conjuntura empresarial, que é 
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caracterizada por avanços tecnológicos e por um cenário 
competitivo dinâmico. Sendo particularmente interessante, este 
estudo de caso considera a interação entre gestão estratégica e 
finanças corporativas, num contexto real de trabalho, como é o 
caso da Rocket Internet (RI), uma empresa incubadora e de 
investimento, cujo objeto são as TI. A história turbulenta vivida 
pela RI, ao tornar-se uma empresa unicórnio, a sua OPA e, mais 
recentemente, a sua desaceleração são analisadas e associadas à 
singular gestão do seu modelo de negócio. Reações negativas 
por parte de investidores evoluíram devido a problemas de 
rentabilidade, falta de transparência, comunicação e valor para o 
acionista. O progresso da RI está intimamente ligado ao seu 
modelo de negócio. A RI precisa de reinventar e inovar o seu 
modelo de negócio, não obstante ser necessário tempo e 
paciência por parte dos investidore
 
When Oliver Samwer (CEO illustrated at the cover page) together with his board members 
Alexander Kudlich (CMO) and Peter Kimpel (CFO) rang the bell of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange on 2nd October 2014, at 09:30 AM, Rocket Internet (RI) had achieved its biggest 
success: The IPO of RI. RI’s controversial business model was finally accepted and even 
appreciated by investors after seven remarkable years. From 2007 to 2014, RI transformed from 
a technology start up to one of Europe’s largest technology companies, being the parent of every 
fourth European unicorn. 1. 
 
Founded as an operating platform for investments and company developments in the technology 
space, RI focused on copying business models from already successful E-commerce companies 
(e.g. Amazon and Alibaba), transferring them to Emerging Markets, adapting them to local 
characteristics (e.g. infrastructure, culture and customer behavior), and scaling operations to 
achieve a market leading position. Who is Rocket comparable to?. 2 In the venture capital sphere, 
RI would be among the largest players in Europe. However, unlike most venture capital firms, 
RI uses solely its own resources to build companies and provides access to its web interface. 
Moreover, unlike E-commerce platforms such as Alibaba or Amazon, RI represents a portfolio 
of investments. Thus, RI prefers not to be categorized within common definitions but instead 
describes itself as ‘We are builders of companies, we are not innovators’. Thus, this case study 
will refer to RI´s activities of developing companies as company-building (see Exhibit 4).  
 
RI’s superior business model, the Rocket Recipe, is for RI what the Coke Recipe is for Coca 
Cola - the formula of success. RI has developed a unique skill in identifying already proven 
business models, replicating them, and applying them in untapped markets, most commonly 
emerging markets. From 2014 on, RI quickly established a market leading position due to its 
aggressive and relentless company-building process based on the Rocket Recipe. However, not 
everyone is fond of RI´s business model. Increasing resistance from Silicon Valley claims that 
‘the Samwer brothers are despicable thieves’. 3. However, RI founder Oliver Samwer points out, 
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that ‘all companies, whether bricks-and-mortar shops or online businesses, are based on 
existing ideas and RI only builds on these ideas to develop even better companies’.  
 
From 2014 to 2017, RI shifted its business model from a company builder to a listed venture 
capital fund - that is, RI invested more frequently and larger amounts in selected companies 
throughout their lifecycle, while the number of company-buildings significantly decreased over 
time. Thus, RI´s share price plunged (see Graphic 4) and investors’ doubts and complaints 
steadily increased, as they still wait to be rewarded, and neither dividends nor share buybacks 
by RI limited their negative earnings per share. Hence, one thing is clear: RI´s shifted business 
model is not appreciated by shareholders. However, is it right to conclude that RI needs to better 
align its business model with shareholders’ interest to be successful in future? 
 
The Road to Rocket Internet 
 
‘Everything big starts small’ – Looking at the early days of RI´s future founders, from 1999 on 
the Samwer brothers interned at various tech start ups in the Silicon Valley, marking the first 
step for their successful career. The three brothers founded companies, became serial 
technology entrepreneurs and then turned into technology investors. Emphasizing the Samwer 
brothers´ sense for business, it is estimated that they raised more than $2.0 billions of funds for 
approximately 260 investments . 4. Two out of three of these investments were either sold or 
cashed out by an IPO tripling their invested capital on average - Industry experts call this a 3.0x 
Money-on-Money Multiple (MM). 
 
The Samwer brothers started their time as technology entrepreneurs when they stumbled across 
eBay, at that time a new business model aiming to disrupt traditional auction houses by 
providing online auction services. Attributing eBay´s unrealized potential to the narrow focus 
on the US market, the Samwer brothers wanted to transfer and implement eBay´s promising 
business model to Germany and pitched the idea to eBay’s senior management– eBay turned 
down their offer. Returning to Germany, the Samwer brothers set up their very own eBay. In 
1999, they built Alando, the German answer to eBay, selling their childhood toys as first auction 
on the online platform. Quickly and relentlessly implementing its business model, Alando 
outpaced fourteen competitors and rapidly increased its customer base. Only three months after 
its building, Alando was one of the largest online auction houses in Germany. Both surprised 
and convinced by Alando’s rapid success in Germany, eBay revised its decision one year later 
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and acquired Alando for $53 million . 5 - making the Samwer brothers the first Internet 
millionaires in Germany and providing them with capital to get started with further investments, 
i.e. Jamba.  
 
Founded in 2000, Jamba evolved to become Europe’s largest provider of ring tones and mobile 
applications, and was eventually sold for $273 million to Verisign in 2004 . 6. Remember the 
Crazy Frog song that was stuck in everyone’s head? Jamba was behind it! The Samwer brothers 
understood to rapidly grow their customer basis heavily investing into advertisement, e.g. TV. 
An approach they should apply more often in future endeavors, resulting in further successful 
company sales. Earning money from sold companies, the Samwer brothers re-invested their 
sale proceeds into new business ideas and companies such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Trivago 
at their early stage. In 2006, the Samwer brothers set up a fund vehicle, the European Founders 
Fund (EFF), to structure their increased number of investments as well as to improve their 
fundraising process. 
 
Rocket Internet’s Development, 2007 - 2013 
 
In 2007, RI was founded as the parent company of Samwer brothers´ existing investments and 
company-buildings. That is, the brothers established a hub of IT know-how, infrastructure, and 
capabilities, being the platform for future investments and company-buildings. The Samwer 
brothers´ strategy should work … at least for a while. 
 
From 2008 to 2014, RI massively invested its funds in diverse company-building processes, to 
mention the most prominent examples, e.g. Zalando (2008), Home24 (2009), HelloFresh (2011) 
or Lazada (2012) (see Error! Reference source not found.). The funds stem from both third 
party financings and sale proceeds of smaller company-building projects such as Bigpoint 
(online game community) and MyCityDeal (discount deals), which were sold for €70 million 
in 2008 and $126 million in 2010, respectively. 
 
Graphic 1: Timeline of RI's most important milestones 
 




Looking at RI´s portfolio companies, they operated mainly in four sectors (see Exhibit 1): 
 Food & Groceries: E.g. Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh;  
 Fashion: E.g. GFG (including Dafiti, Lamoda, Namshi and Zalora); 
 General Merchandise: E.g. Jumia; and 
 Home & Living: E.g. Westwing and Home24.  
 
The portfolio companies, which were built from scratch, can be categorized according to the 
frequency and amount of funding they have received over their lifecycle (see Exhibit 2): 
 Concepts: Include companies of the E-commerce, Marketplaces and FinTech space that 
have been recently built or which are in the process of being built . 7 (e.g. Smartelite).  
 Emerging Stars: Include companies that have already completed funding rounds and tend 
to be one to three years old. The emerging stars stem from companies from the Travel space 
(Travelbird and Traveloka), the FinTech space (Paymill, Lendico and Zencap), the E-
commerce space (Zanui) and Marketplaces space (Cuponation, Helpling and Wimdu) . 8.  
 Proven Winners: Comprise the largest and most mature companies of the portfolio, which 
are the market leaders in their respective markets. On average these companies are four to 
six years old and reach breakeven between five and seven years (Marketplaces), or six to 
nine years (E-commerce). The six proven winners involve Delivery Hero, Hello Fresh, 
Home24, GFG, Jumia and Westwing. 
 
Rocket Internet in 2014 
	
Zalando’s IPO: Proven Winner 
Rising from Concepts to proven winners, Zalando is truly a success story for RI, which 
culminated in its IPO in 2014. In 2008, the Samwer brothers built Zalando by copying the 
business model of the American online shoe store Zappos and by expanding the product 
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offering with clothing and fashion items. Within the next five years, Zalando quickly 
accomplished a market leading position in the European E-commerce market. Key drivers for 
this rapid success have been the heavy funding of TV advertising and consistent efficiency 
improvements of Zalando’s supply chain. Both initiatives ensured a fast brand building and a 
more compelling shopping experience for its customers. After following years of ever-
improving Zalando’s customer lifetime value (CLV) . 9 by consistently fine-tuning the usability 
of the online platform, logistics and retour processes - the efforts paid off: Zalando was one of 
the largest European technology IPOs ever, valuing the company with €5.3 billion . 10. To date it 
remains RI’s biggest success. 
RI’s IPO: Further large investments and company-buildings 
Zalando´s successful IPO demonstrated that the capital markets were optimistic about on 
technology IPOs, in case the private company’s business model was well understood and 
underpinned by a strong management team. Considering this positive investor sentiment, the 
Samwer brothers wanted to take the next level – the IPO of RI. Similar to Zalando, RI also 
showed a history of consistent sales growth with a large potential to continue this trend. The 
Samwer brothers considered RI´s IPO as a big chance to increase RI’s liquidity and to get 
greater access for funding investments and company-buildings in the future. Although RI 
achieved significant growth in sales within its first seven years, RI was not able to consistently 
generate profits. However, the market didn´t mind yet and RI´s IPO was a success story. Stock 
market investors not only believed in the Samwer brothers’ excellent track record of successful 
company-buildings and investments in the internet industry, but also saw in RI the opportunity 
to gain access to fast-growing emerging countries. As a result, RI received heavy demand for 
its shares and roughly doubled the raised proceeds expected when announced its IPO of €1.6bn. 
The offering was over-subscribed well in excess of ten times at the top end of the price range. 
With a market capitalization of €7.9 billion . 11, RI’s IPO marked Europe’s largest technology 
IPO so far. According to RI’s IPO prospectus as of 2014, the IPO proceeds should be primarily 
used to ‘finance its future growth through the launch of new businesses and providing further 
equity capital to its network of companies’. Bearing that in mind, in seven years RI has turned 
into a European key player in the technology space, which was vigorous and ready to expand 
its existing and upcoming businesses. 
 
Graphic 2: Rocket Internet Financial Snapshot (fully consolidated) 
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Key	Income	Statement	 2014A 2015A 2016A
(EUR	millions)
Sales 128 128 50
Adjusted	EBITDA	 -155 -176 -75
Net	Income	(Adjusted) 463 -203 -697
Key	Cash	Flow	Statement
Cash	Flow	from	Operations -95 -106 -86
Cash	Flow	from	Investing -62 -1,300 -120
Cash	Flow	from	Financing 1,760 1,120 -166
Change	in	Cash 1,600 -285 -367
Free	Cash	Flow -1,644 -118 -92
Key	Balance	Sheet
Cash	&	Equivalents 2,060 1,760 1,400
Total	Assets 3,920 5,000 4,200
Short-term	debt 10 12 37
Long-term	debt 5 527 333
Total	Equity 3,770 4,350 3,750  
Source: Rocket Internet Company Reporting 
 
Business Model: The ‘Rocket Recipe’ 
 
The Ingredients 
RI’s successful IPO raises the question of what makes this company outstanding and what 
drives its success in such a short period of time. The answer is given by RI´s superior business 
model: The Rocket Recipe, which can be seen as a tool for achieving what Oliver Samwer 
describes: ’Every new company is like a speedboat, and we want them to become aircraft 
carriers’. 12 The critical component is speed – in terms of the company-building process, setting 
up and scaling of operations, and establishing strong and consistent revenue growth. When the 
companies have achieved a so-called critical size (e.g. revenues of at least €100m), the 
companies’ focus can shift towards profitability improvements by controlling costs, while 
pursuing a more modest growth path. This path of profitable growth makes the companies more 
stable and resilient to external shocks, like an aircraft carrier. Besides, RI not only builds 
companies from scratch, but also invests into early stage companies. RI’s CEO Oliver Samwer 
summarizes the superiority of RI’s Rocket Recipe: ‘we just build faster and better in more 
instances than anyone else’. The seven steps of the Rocket Recipe break down these instances, 
in which RI excels competitors (see Graphic 3). 
 
Graphic 3: The ‘Rocket Recipe’ 
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Source: Own illustration based on Rocket Internet Company Reporting 
 
#1: Selecting Business Models  
 
The Rocket Recipe follows a Top-Down approach: Global key trends such as the disruptive 
power of software, increasing mobile device diversity, and the accelerated rate of smartphone 
penetration in Emerging Markets are perceived as particularly interesting. According to RI, 
already proven business models around E-commerce, Marketplaces and Fin Tech offer the 
greatest potential for building a new company and developing it into a unicorn. Most 
commonly, these already proven business models stem from the USA (e.g. Amazon, eBay, 
Airbnb) or China (e.g. Alibaba), and target a significant market of at least $1.0 billion in market 
size and $100m in revenue with a low competition level. RI backs companies most commonly 
from areas of (see Exhibit 1): 
 E-s: Conducting commercial transactions electronically on the Internet; 
 Marketplaces: Ensuring that sellers and buyers are matched for millions of order 
processing in the travel, real estate, transport and food delivery markets; and 
 Fin Tech: Enabling small and mid-capped businesses to fund their operations bilaterally, 
apart from the established processes with usual financial institutions.  
 
#2: Selecting Untapped Markets 
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The feasibility of a roll-out to Emerging Markets is evaluated in a 60 - 90 day window. In case 
of a positive evaluation in terms of the business models’ financial and commercial viability, the 
business models are envisaged to be simultaneously rolled-out to three to six Emerging Markets 
including: 
 Africa: E.g. Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia; 
 Latin America: E.g. Brazil and Mexico; 
 Europe and Middle East: E.g. India, Kazakhstan, Russia and UAE; 
 South East Asia: E.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
#3: RI as Operating Platform 
 
From day one of the company-building, the companies can rely on RI’s well-diversified 
spectrum of investors, consisting of sector specialists (e.g. Digital Sky Technologies, and New 
Enterprise Associates), Strategic Partners (e.g. Kinnevik, and Tesco), and Institutional Investors 
(e.g. J.P. Morgan, and Goldman Sachs). Furthermore, the companies also have access to RI’s 
centralized technology platform, which provides them with IT know-how, data warehouses and 
best practice approaches, enabling an ongoing data-driven optimization of the operational 
business (see Error! Reference source not found.). One of RI’s best practice approaches is to 
focus on the optimization of CLV and Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) . 13. Key features for 
improving CAC and CLV are Customer Relationship Management (CRM) tools, Search 
Engineering Marketing (SEM) and the access to payment solutions. 
 
#4: Deep Localization  
 
However, ‘It’s very hard to take a business model and adapt it successfully to a divergent 
market. Think about cultural, legal, geographic, economic, institutional and other ways in 
which countries differ’ . 14. Local operations and sourcing teams are important to identify and 
understand the opportunities, threats and dynamics of local markets. For instance, setting up 
own logistics or offering alternative payment methods makes the customers’ shopping 
experience more comfortable, and increases CAC and CLV – essential for rapidly scaling 
businesses.  
 
#5: Mobile First Strategy  
Entering untapped markets abroad, RI provides users with the opportunity to access their 
business on mobile devices first. As smartphones are widely distributed in the Emerging 
Rocket Internet Case Study: Quo Vadis Rocket Internet? 
 9 
Markets, they offer the best and most comfortable point of sale (POS) with the customer, before 
transferring them to the desktop experience.  
 
#6: Scaling and Realization of Synergies 
 
With the centralized construction kit for the companies, economies of scale are realized and a 
significant knowledge share allows the entrepreneurs avoid mistakes that potential competitors 
would make. RI expects the businesses in general to break-even within on average six to eight 
years according to the theme ‘Scale. Scale. Scale. And the rest will come’. In case the new 
companies are profitably growing into a long-term market leading position, they receive on 
average total funding of $2 million . 15.  
 
#7: Value crystallization 
RI’s last step includes to crystallize value by exiting its companies. Most commonly, RI realizes 
the company exits by either selling the companies (to larger competitors: e.g. Lazada was sold 
to Alibaba), or by transforming the companies built from private to public companies (e.g. IPO 
of Zalando). While an IPO offers a company a lot of advantages such as generating liquidity 
for shareholders, owners, and investors, it also increased costs (e.g. for paying audit companies, 
investment banks and lawyers), and meeting new reporting standards with the potential loss of 
privacy need to be considered as well. Nevertheless, high growth companies usually prefer 
IPOs, as they are a means of further securing funds in the future to continue their growth path. 
Following the valuation, RI has not only cashed out its investment but also de-risked its 
portfolio. 
 
After having reviewed the best practices for each ingredients #1 - #7, Delivery Hero and Hello 
Fresh demonstrate that the Rocket Recipe can be a one-stop solution for building unicorns. As 
a result, it is no coincidence that Delivery Hero (#57) and Hello Fresh (#1) find themselves in 
Financial Times’ ‘Europe’s 1000 fastest growing companies’ from 2012 to 2015. 16. 
 
The ‘Rocket Recipe’: Hello Fresh 
 
Hello Fresh, in which RI currently holds ca. 53%. 17, represents a best practice example for 
Rocket Recipe’s company-building approach. Germany-based Hello Fresh provides online 
food services on a global scale, offering a subscription service in which customers receive a 
weekly box of recipes and meal ideas . 18. The global food market is estimated to have a size of 
€6.5 trillion and offers substantial growth prospects. This is due to the global reach of the online 
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business model and the low market penetration of only 1% currently. Besides, Hello Fresh 
competes with offline food providers such as Aldi, Mark & Spencer or Waitrose, and similarly 
to Netflix they try to disrupt the offline competitive landscape by exploiting customers´ 
convenience with regular delivery service.  
 
Development, 2011 – 2017 
From 2011 onwards, Hello Fresh experienced ‘in five years (..) what a normal company 
undergoes in 20’. The main challenge for Hello Fresh and its CEO Dominik Richter has been 
to attract new customers for their meal package delivery concept and to transfer them into loyal 
long-term customers. The only way for explaining meal packages to customers was either by 
granting discounts on first orders or by significantly increasing marketing expenses to increase 
brand awareness. Using plain slogans such as ‘No Planning, No Shopping, No Waste’, the much 
desired growth has been primarily realized by geographical expansions into markets such as 
Belgium, Switzerland and Canada in 2015 and 2016. Since Q1 2014, the company almost 
consistently increased every quarter’s revenues €2.3 million in 2012 to €305 million 
(Compound Annual Growth Rate > 400%). Despite these impressive developments, plans in 
October 2015 to go public failed because the IPO market was not, what bankers call, ‘hot’ 
anymore, valuing Hello Fresh considerably below the management board estimates. After this 
blowback, Hello Fresh decided to further strengthen its market positions through product 
diversification. As a result, new features on the website platform (e.g. individualization of 
recipes, Hello Fresh FamilyBox, Breakfast recipes or the 20 minute meals) were launched. By 
doing so, Hello Fresh established strong Adjusted EBITDA (AEBITDA) improvements by 
nearly halving the absolute AEBITDA losses, translated into an AEBITDA margin 
improvement from -32% in Q4 2015 to -7.4% in Q2 2017. 19.  
 
Global Leader, Online Consumer Food Market 
Looking at the financial perspective, Hello Fresh’s business implies recurring subscription 
based revenues and just-in-time fulfilment centers that generate a low asset base with minimal 
inventory and negative working capital. These factors drove the rapid scaling of the business 
into nine countries simultaneously: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, UK and USA. Except for the USA, Hello Fresh inherits the market 
leading position in the other eight markets. To date, Hello Fresh has raised ca. €364 million of 
total funds. 
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Competitive Landscape in the USA 
Looking at the future, Hello Fresh’s main goal is to become the market leader in the USA in 
2018, and to breakeven on a group level until 2019 (see Exhibit 5). Currently, the competitive 
landscape in the US market is dominated by Blue Apron. In early 2017, there was speculation 
that Blue Apron would seek an IPO valuation of $3.0 billion, which implied a positive effect 
on Hello Fresh, as it was close to the size of its US peer. However, Blue Apron´s actual IPO 
was priced at $10/share, the bottom end of a range that was reduced from $15-17/share to $10-
11/share, with an implied market capitalization of only $1.9 billion. However, what came after 
was even worse: Amazon has started to sell meal kits and also acquired Whole Foods for a total 
consideration of $13.7 billion . 20. Considering Blue Apron´s downturn and Amazon´s step into 
the food market (saving on marketing costs and being comfortable undercutting on price), there 
is a clear question mark on the competitive outlook of the online consumer food industry in the 
USA, and thus on Hello Fresh’s short-term goal. Not such good news for Hello Fresh and its 
IPO prospects, although its business model proved to be more resilient than competitors’ ones 
in the light of the US market´s development.  
 
The ‘Rocket Recipe’: Delivery Hero 
 
Delivery Hero, in which RI currently holds ca. 26%. 21, represents a best practice example for 
RI’s investment approach. Germany-based Delivery Hero, founded in May 2011, provides 
online food delivery services to restaurants and cafes in more than 40 countries. 22, while being 
market leader in 35 countries. The company is the largest food network in the world with more 
than 150,000 restaurant partners and more than 171 million orders processed in 2016. Offering 
customer services through websites, mobile and tablet apps, Delivery Hero emphasizes 
customers’ convenience, reliability and quality of the ordering and delivery process.  
 
Global Leader, Online takeaway market 
In February 2015, RI deviated from building companies only. That is, RI did not build Delivery 
Hero from scratch but instead acquired a 30% stake for €496 million, increasing to €657 million 
over time. RI built a similar company to Delivery Hero, Foodpanda, which quickly rose to RI’s 
proven winners. Foodpanda continued to grow fast through acquiring competitors such as 
Talabat, La Nevera Roja, and Pizzabo.it. As a result, two large online takeaway providers with 
complementary geographical scope have been created. However, there can only be one. After 
investing further €37m in Foodpanda, RI transferred these assets to Delivery Hero for stock and 
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acquired further shares (€52m) in the group, such that RI had a 39% stake of Delivery Hero by 
March 2015. In December 2016, Delivery Hero acquired Foodpanda, increasing RI’s stake to 
37.7% stake in Delivery Hero forming a global leader in the online takeaway market. As a 
result, Delivery Hero’s sales, number of orders, and revenue considerably increased by more 
than 60% from 2015 to 2016 . 23. Not only strong financial figures backed Delivery Hero’s 
business model, but also external proof was received by the investment of well reputable online 
investor Naspers (€387m for a 13% stake in Delivery Hero), leading to an increased LPV of 
Delivery Hero of €3.0bn. To date more than $1.0 billion have been invested into Delivery Hero 
in various funding rounds (Series A – G) and private equity deals. 
 
Competitive Landscape 
Rumors have occurred that Delivery Hero could tap into the equity markets quite soon, 
following its peers Grubhub, JustEat and Takeaway, that are already listed on stock exchanges 
(see Exhibit 6). Positive momentum arises from the highly fragmented and large market size 
(estimated at €6.5 trillion) of the online food takeaway segment and existing investor appetite 
for this kind of business model. However, Delivery Hero differs from its peers due to its 
company history and financials, so that the critical question remains whether Delivery Hero is 
already a suitable candidate for an IPO. 
 
Rocket Internet’s Transformation to a Listed Venture Capital Fund 
 
After its IPO in September 2014, RI’s story of success continued. RI’s Last Portfolio Value 
(LPV). 24 increased from €2.7 billion at the end of fiscal year 2014 to €6.1 billion in 2015. Key 
drivers have been the strong development of proven winners with growth rates of more than 
100% in revenues and EBITDA margin improvement by 10pp on a yoy level. However, due to 
complicated and time consuming negotiations with 3rd parties regarding the strategic and 
financial development of its proven winners, RI decided to shift its investment strategy from a 
major shareholder (on average 33% ownership of proven winners) towards a majority 
shareholder approach (> 50% ownership of proven winners) . 25. Selective M&A activities should 
complement RI’s adjusted investment strategy in cases where scale and synergies justify the 
purchase price (e.g. Delivery Hero in 2015) . 26.  
 
In 2016, RI’s investment strategy was characterized by a disciplined capital allocation, with 
overall limited funding amounts of €250 - €350 million. Furthermore, RI set up the RICP, which 
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focuses on both early and later stage investments, and marked a turning point for RI. 27 (see 
Exhibit 3). RI’s CFO, Peter Kimpel pointed out that ‘the Fund provides access to capital […] 
Furthermore, Rocket Internet and its shareholders participate in the returns generated by the 
investments made by the Fund’. 28. RICP’s investment focus is on technology based companies, 
particularly in the sub-segments of Consumer Tech, Fin Tech, Food Tech, Property Tech, B2B 
SaaS, and Travel Tech. All in all, the set up of the RICP, a new funding vehicle, marked a 
milestone and will provide RI with more than $1.0bn of additional investment power. On the 
other side, the RICP will make RI walk away from its operating platform business model, the 
Rocket Recipe, because the number of company-buildings decreases and the investment 
frequency and amount increases.  
 
Negative Investor Sentiment 
From March 2016 on, the sentiment regarding RI’s shares drastically became negative, as first 
indications of a conflict with long-term investor and large shareholder Kinnevik (see Exhibit 2) 
became public. Kinnevik was not completely convinced about RI’s Africa business as the 
Swedish investor hedged its bets on Jumia by investing in its main rival Konga. Besides, 
Kinnevik considered RI´s proven winners less prosperous than RI does, based on LPV . 29. 
Additional negative media coverage was based on RI’s complicated network construction of 
more than 100 direct and indirect holdings and its non disclosure of non-controlling stakes. One 
question, which was frequently discussed in the investor community, was: ‘Is RI able to realize 
the value of its individual companies?’ Given RI’s newly established majority shareholding 
driven investment approach, Kinnevik and RI frequently competed against each other in terms 
of growth investment ideas, resulting in a conflict of interests. Doubts regarding RI’s ability to 
turn its proven winners into profitable companies started to spread across the markets. May 
2016 marked the beginning of RI’s share price sell off: Kinnevik left RI’s supervisory board 
and shortly after it sold its 13% stake in RI for €426 . 30. Kinnevik’s interim head Joakim 
Andersson pointed out, that ‘Our business models have become too similar. Rocket isn’t just 
building up young companies any more, it’s also investing in larger companies. We’re doing 
the same thing’. During 2009 and 2013, the Swedish investment company invested €155 million 
and received €510 million in cash and dividends (pre-IPO), and divested its entire stake in RI 
for an accumulated €426 million . 31. This amounts to an IRR of >90% and 6.0x MM – which can 
be seen as a very profitable investment, even for the successful Swedish investment company. 
As good as it was for Kinnevik, it was as bad for RI: The sale of Kinnevik’s shareholdings on 
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7th June 2017 led to another significant plunge in RI’s share price to €20.98 (-51% since IPO) . 
32. 
 
Quo Vadis Rocket Internet?  
 
Since RI´s IPO in 2014, RI invested ca. €1.7 billion, which seems rather low in the light of RI´s 
many portfolio companies and leads to RI´s increasing cash pile (€2.4 billion as of 30 June 
2017). However, taken RI´s large cash pile together with its plunged share price since IPO (see 
Graphic 4), criticism from RI´s shareholders has been increasing steadily. The shareholders 
started to disagree with RI’s constrained payout policy, which neither pays out regular or special 
dividends nor share buybacks. The media picked up this sentiment and questioned the prospects 
and profitability of RI’s business model. At the end of September 2016, RI reported the H1 
2016 figures, stating a loss of €617 million (H1 2015: €45.9 million), which primarily was 
triggered by Global Fashion Group’s (one of RI’s proven winners) valuation slash from €3.1 
billion to €1.0 billion due to a down-round . 33. RI’s management board played down these figures 
by emphasizing that the increased loss would reflect one-time write offs and deconsolidation 
activities, while the companies would be on track operationally. However, most analysts from 
investment banks linked the write downs to RI’s non-transparent valuation methodology of its 
network companies, concluding that the profitability path of these companies was far off, 
resulting in further plunges of RI´s share price (see Graphic 4). 
 
Graphic 4: RI’s share price development since IPO 
 
At this moment, about one-third of Rocket's free float is out on loan to investors betting against 
the company and short interest remained high throughout the year . . 34. Undoubtedly, RI’s proven 
winners show significant potential for value crystallization, however only two of them were 
realistic IPO candidates in 2017, both of which are highly dependent on how favorable the IPO 
market window might be. Additional concerns come from the significantly decreased company-
building activity in 2017 and the rather thin pipeline for 2018. Investors frequently raise one 
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Is the Current Business Model outdated? 
The increasingly negative perception of RI pointed out that RI did a poor job in explaining its 
business model to investors. A former RI executive takes the same line: ‘It’s just incredibly 
hard for investors to judge a group with such a diverse portfolio of early-stage companies’. 
Most commonly this results in a so called ‘illegitimacy discount’.  . 35. This phenomenon describes  
that companies, which span multiple business and industry segments are traded at a discount 
due to reduced audience attention. If the Samwer brothers want to achieve a clearance, they 
would have to better communicate with the investor community. Pitched as an ‘operating 
platform’ at the IPO in October 2014, RI is developing into a listed venture capital fund. 
However, the consequence of this development is that RI is only able to generate profits when 
investments in proven winners are exited by selling them to strategic sellers or by publicly 
floating them. In this respect, the sale of companies to strategic sellers tends to be the alternative 
to maximizing the companies’ values, as strategic sellers are usually able to afford higher 
premia. By holding the assets longer as financial investors, strategic investors are able to bundle 
new assets with existing ones and can realize respective synergies from combining them. That 
being said, RI’s investments need several years for their path on value crystallization (e.g. 
selling companies to strategic sellers or publicly floating them), which is not easy to 
communicate at the stock exchange’s short-term profitability pressure and myopic view on 
companies’ development. Only a minority of public shareholders have the patience to wait 
several years for gaining value. Therefore, it is no surprise that there is a discrepancy between 
RI’s share price (market capitalization) and its net asset value. Like many publicly traded 
investment or private equity funds, RI also trades at a discount of 39% (Q2 2017), compared to 
its net asset value of €4.3 billion36. 
 
Commitment to The Public Markets or Back to Earth 
Since its foundation in 2007 until 2015, RI achieved great success based on its Rocket Recipe. 
RI in form of its proven winners achieved astonishing growth, while becoming formidable E-
commerce competitors in their respective markets. However, particularly the years from 2015 
onwards have illustrated that it cannot be expected to consistently maintain this rapid growth 
rate for a long period of time, considering macroeconomic developments, increasing 
competition in Emerging Markets and the experience of E-commerce development in China, 
US and Europe. It’s still too early to predict whether RI can gain a dominant position in their 
respective markets over the long term.  
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However, one thing is sure – RI’s situation cannot continue for much longer. Oliver Samwer 
has a decision to make and several options are on the table. On the one hand, Oliver Samwer 
could delist RI. On the other hand, RI could use its large cash pile to pay dividends and/or buy 
back shares to reward impatient investors, especially bearing in mind that an IPO of Delivery 
Hero and Hello Fresh might be far off after the failed IPOs of their peers. The question remains 









Source: Rocket Internet Company Information 
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Exhibit 2  RI's proven winners in 2014 
 
Source: Reuters Eikon Terminal, Rocket Internet Company Information and TechCrunch 
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Exhibit 3  RI’s strategy evolvement over time 
 
 
      * Thomson Reuters Consensus Estimate 
      Source: Rocket Internet Company Information 
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Source: Rocket Internet Company Information 
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Exhibit 6  Delivery Hero vs. Peers (Grubhub, JustEat, Takeaway.com) 
 




2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
(EUR millions)*              
Sales - 88.0 166.2 297.0 209.8 333.2 470.5 157.0 247.6 375.7 46.7 76.7 111.6 
Growth - - 88.9% 78.7% - 58.8% 41.2% - 57.7% 51.7% - 64.2% 45.5% 
Marketing Expense 
(% of Sales) 
- - 120.6% 74.9% 26.1% 25.2% 22.4% n.a. 35.0% 28.4% 53.3% 76.9% 74.0% 
EBITDA Margin 34.1% -81.3% -92.9% -35.8% 29.9% 25.8% 24.5% 18.0% 23.8% 29.8% -6.4% -18.5% -19.8% 
Operating Margin 24.7% -92.4% -123.0% -56.2% 0.18 17.1% 17.0% 12.1% 15.5% 24.3% -13.6% -24.4% -24.4% 
Earnings Power              
ROIC - -33.9% -29.3% -14.6% 3.2% 4.1% 4.8% 41.0% 5.4% 9.2% -18.0% -30.6% -24.8% 
ROE 8.8% -55.7% -45.4% -22.0% 3.6% 4.6% 5.4% 44.0% 5.7% 9.9% -19.2% -33.1% -26.0% 
Liquidity              
Current Ratio 1.08 0.75 1.07 1.25 3.17 3.98 3.59 2.70 1.87 1.05 1.23 0.44 3.40 
Cash Cycle (Days) 40.0 -723.9 -844.0 -418.8 47.2 39.5 38.1 -578.7 -634.2 -527.1 -586.3 -542.7 -391.0 
Leverage              
Assets/Equity 1.62 1.92 1.80 1.81 1.27 1.21 1.23 1.44 1.22 1.28 1.28 1.59 1.26 
 
* For Grubhub USD/EUR conversion was calculated with FX-rates as of 31-December: (2014: 1.2101, 2015: 1.0858, 2016: 1.04844), for Just Eat GBP/EUR 
conversion was calculated with FX-rates as of 31-December: (2014: 0.7763, 2015: 0.7377; 2016: 0.8553) 
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Source: Company Investor Relations, Reuters Eikon Terminal 
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Exhibit 7  Delivery Hero vs. Peers (Grubhub, JustEat, Takeaway.com) cont’d 
 
Peers 
 (as of 2017-06-30) 
Market Capitalization  
($m) 
Sales LTM  
($m) 
Price /  
Sales LTM 
 
? 383.5 -- 
 
5,689.2 480.1 11.85x 
 
1,736.2 120.4 14.42x 
 
3,760.4 537.2 7.00x 
Peer Mean 3,758.5 480.1 11.85x 
Example: Calculating Just Eat’s Market Capitalization = Sales LTM * Price/Sales LTM = 480.1* 11.85 = 5,689.2 
  
Source: Company Investor Relations, Reuters Eikon Terminal 
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Exhibit 8  Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh – good IPO candidates? 










Upside potential / Revenue: 
 Rule of Thumb: Revenue > €100m; and  
 Strong prospects for future revenue growth. 
  ? 
  ? 


  ? 




 Debt/Equity, ROE, Marketing expenses 

















Compelling equity story:  
 Management credibility and experience; 
 Quality of strategy & execution; and 
 Brand strength. 
  ? 
  ? 
  ? 

 
  ? 
  ? 
  ? 

 
Understandable business model: 
 Recurring revenue business; 
 Operational effectiveness; and 













Source: Own illustration based on Delivery Hero Company Information and Hello Fresh Company Information  
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Exhibit 9  Interview with selected RI employees 
 
#1 Interview with Fabian Zilker, Corporate Finance Manager, Rocket Internet 
 
Q1: How does Rocket Internet create customer value? Please give an example of a Rocket Internet company.  
 
FZ: Rocket Internet creates customer value by optimizing operations and technology of a portfolio company. I have to admit that sounds quite 
abstract – lets take an example, that most people are probably familiar with: Zalando. If you would have ordered, lets say a t-shirt, at the very first 
month on the online store – it took quite some time as you received your parcel at home with the t-shirt in it. Rocket Internet has tremendously 
helped here by both providing funds, but also the know-how and experience how to implement quick wins, the customer recognizes and appreciates. 
So when you would have done the same exercise again few months later – you would have received the parcel with the t-shirt some hours earlier 
with a discount for further purchases on top.  
 
Q2: Please describe Rocket Internet's strategy and its business model?  
 
FZ: I personally would outline it as the following: Rocket Internet’s strategy is to back companies in the early and growth stage to achieve the next 
stage in the lifecycle as efficient and as fast as possible. By providing sector expertise, funding, knowledge and IT-infrastructure, it is the perfect 
Strategic Partner a young company needs to outperform its peers. So its about both: Building the companies from scratch, what is referred to as 
Incubation, and Investing in already existing companies. In both approaches there is a replicable process in place, which ensures a standardized 
flow of actions in a minimum amount of time. – as time is essential in today’s fast paced business environment. In short, we give our companies a 
head start, which increases the companies’ likelihood to succeed in the long-term.  
 
Q3: Please describe the development of Rocket Internet's business model and the consequence of Rocket Internet’s IPO in October 2014.  
 
FZ: I think Rocket Internet’s business model evolved over time and gets quickly adapted to meet new challenges. First, it basically was all about 
Incubation. Later, the frequency and amount of investments increased steadily over time, culminated in the 30% stake acquisition of Delivery Hero. 
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So right now, we are at a point, at which the company has a less stringent business model: It frequently invests its cash in early stage and growth 
companies, but also incubates companies – but more selectively as at the beginning. To put it differently, after becoming a public company we can 
say Rocket Internet has become an adult. 
 
Q4: From a financial perspective, which key performance indicators would you take and why in order to measure a superior business 
model in the internet industry? Please elaborate on the evaluation process and the dependencies of the KPIs. 
 
FZ: I think in this industry three components are key: Growth, growth and growth. In the internet industry its all about growth: Your last active 
customer figure, your processed orders, your customer lifetime value and your sales, all together have to consistently grow. Of course, you have to 
control costs as well, but this comes later. Once you have achieved a threshold of size, which is usually measured in sales, then its time to talk 
about profitability and your progress of improving. EBITDA margins and cash-burn ratios that you are able to transform these growth companies 
in profitable as well. So, of course, you only should compare companies in the same lifecycle.  
 
Q5: When financially assessing Rocket Internet, which KPIs does Rocket Internet use and what would you conclude for Rocket Internet?  
 
FZ: Well, when we talk about Rocket Internet, we actually talk about its portfolio companies. As most of the companies stem from the Tech Space 
– it makes sense to use industry specific KPIs such as Last Active Customer, Customer Acquisition Cost, Customer Lifetime Value, Total orders 
next to traditional KPIs such as sales growth, EBITDA Margin, Marketing expenses and cash-burn rate. 
 
Q6: What do you understand under Shareholder Value? How do you think does Rocket Internet create Shareholder Value?  
 
FZ: For me personally Shareholder Value means that shareholders participate in a company’s success via the share price, share buybacks, etc. In 
case of Rocket Internet, I can definitely see that – however we don’t have to forget that Rocket Internet is listed since 2014 and therefore needs 
still time to reach the ideal state of maximizing shareholder value. 
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Q7: ‘Rocket Internet has been increasing its cash surplus steadily - resulting from ongoing successful exits which exceed new investment 
funding. Based on Rocket Internet´s strategic and financial positioning, does Rocket Internet have a superior business model? 
 
FZ: You mentioned the successful exits – for me that is proof that Rocket Internet obviously has a superior business model. I have to honestly 
admit that from my point of view Rocket Internet does not have one major competitor, much more Rocket Internet with different players: Large 
technology companies, Venture Capital Funds and Private Equity firms. But I think, this is exactly the strength of the business model: It’s flexible 
and easily adaptable, so from my understanding also very resilient, as the business model can quite fast adapt to changing environments. 
 
Q8: Where do you see Rocket Internet in five years? What are the key challenges? What are areas of improvement? 
 
FZ: Obviously a lot depends on future large projects if they pay off and are able to generate regular earnings and will be reflected in a higher share 
price. So, as I said before, Rocket Internet accumulates experience and knowledge continuously. Therefore, I expect the company to even better 
adapt to new challenges in the future.  However, given the complexity of today’s world – in particular the dynamic environment of technology – it 
is almost impossible to answer this question. 
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#2 Interview with Kaan Oglou, Business Development Manager, Rocket Internet 
 
Q1: How does Rocket Internet create customer value? Please give an example of a Rocket Internet company.  
 
KO: When Rocket Internet backs a company by giving advice or providing cash, you can be sure that the companies will significantly improve in 
areas, which matter to the customers. For instance, when we talk about the huge segment of E-commerce. Its all about customer friendliness – how 
can I get from selecting the item I want to buy as fast and as easy as possible to the final payment action. An example out of many would be Jumia. 
 
Q2: Please describe Rocket Internet's strategy and its business model?  
 
KO: Its basically the answer of the previous question in a high level perspective. So what do I mean with that? As the example of Jumia, Rocket 
Internet provides young technology based companies with everything they need – IT, Experience, Network and Financing – to make incredibly 
fast progress. Just look at Zalando, Delivery Hero or Hello Fresh. By exactly knowing what to do, this happens very efficient. In case everything 
goes well, Rocket Internet usually sells the companies to larger competitors or takes the company public. Both to realize returns and to de-risk its 
balance sheet. 
 
Q3: Please describe the development of Rocket Internet's business model and the consequence of Rocket Internet’s IPO in October 2014.  
 
KO: I think at the beginning in 2014, Rocket Internet’s business model was much more focused on the actual company-building aspect. Over time, 
I think it is fair to say, that this focus shifted more to investments. Nowadays, Rocket Internet also has the fire power to do large investments. So, 
I would definitely say that the company has become more flexible from a business model point of view.  
 
Q4: From a financial perspective, which key performance indicators would you take and why in order to measure a superior business 
model in the internet industry? Please elaborate on the evaluation process and the dependencies of the KPIs. 
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KO: When we look at the largest Tech companies worldwide: Amazon, Facebook etc.. One thing has become quite clear – it is a long and rocky 
road to glory. Usually it takes you at least six to nine years to become profitable. But to reach this point, you have to consistently show large growth 
rates year by year for achieving a critical mass making sure that you have established a solid customer base, superior business model and also great 
growth potential. In detail, I would look at the very beginning on revenue growth (5-year CAGR: > 30%), increase in orders, active customer, 
Gross Merchandise Value, which is basically what the customer puts in his virtual basket, and cash-burn ratio. After achieving the critical mass, 
profitability has to be improved fast e.g. EBITDA Margin, Reduction in Customer Acquisition Cost etc. 
 
Q5: When financially assessing Rocket Internet, which KPIs does Rocket Internet use and what would you conclude for Rocket Internet?  
 
KO: Basically I think every KPI mentioned before should occur. Obviously the proven winners have a large impact on assessing Rocket Internet. 
Rocket Internet, but these companies are also in different stages in their lifetime cycle so its hard to generalize it. There are portfolio companies 
that are well on track, while others need more time than expected to grow into market leading positions etc. But all together, I think Rocket Internet 
is well on track. 
 
Q6: What do you understand under Shareholder Value? How do you think does Rocket Internet create Shareholder Value?  
 
KO: Do I participate in the company’s success? Related to Rocket Internet, considering the share price, I would say that there is room for 
improvement. However, I think the differences to other businesses lie that earnings are not easy to plan and thus not easy to realize. Investors 
usually do not like any surprises, so a lot depends on your investment horizon, if you want to invest in the mid-term and short-term, from my point 
of view, it will surely pay off. 
 
Q7: ‘Rocket Internet has been increasing its cash surplus steadily - resulting from ongoing successful exits which exceed new investment 
funding. Based on Rocket Internet´s strategic and financial positioning, does Rocket Internet have a superior business model? 
 
KO: From my understanding, I can answer this question with a yes. Considering the fast and rapid success of Rocket Internet, the company is only 
ten years old, from transforming of a technology start-up to a multi billion company, this has to be based on a superior business model. I think, 
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from a strategic point of view, the flexibility of the business model to either invest in companies or to build them from scratch with Rocket Internet’s 
unique experience and know how, is certainly the largest reason for the superior model. This gets complemented by also being able to monetize 
this superior business model into superior returns – just look at Lazada, Zalando and much more.  
 
Q8: Where do you see Rocket Internet in five years? What are the key challenges? What are areas of improvement? 
 
KO: In the following five years Rocket Internet, again has to find the next disruptive powers that will change our environment e.g. blockhain or 
something completely different. If Rocket Internet manages to do so, particularly with its unique expertise and capabilities, the company can be 
one of the winner in five years. The area of improvement lies in the share price, but this will improve by itself, when the company is able to show 
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 ‘We are builders of companies, we are not innovators’ (Oliver Samwer). Referring to RI´s activity 
of developing companies, Oliver Samwer´s expression of ‘company-building’ is used. Pitched as 
an operating platform for investments and company-building projects at its IPO in 2014, Rocket 
Internet (RI) grew to one of Europe’s largest technology companies. After a time of continued 
positive momentum, headwinds arose. Large shareholder Kinnevik sold its stakes in RI in 2016, 
fueling investors’ uncertainty of RI’s business model. After RI´s significant share price plunge, 
investors question whether RI is able to generate profits and to establish a viable business model. 
 
Position in Course 
This case is intended for use on evaluating business models’ implications on company performance 
and the business models’ perception by its shareholders. It highlights that operating a business 
model is an ongoing process of redefining and reshaping. The case also provides insights into a 
public company’s need to establish a clear business model, which results in regularly generated 
earnings, and the need to properly communicate this business model to shareholders. Students are 
envisaged to connect and apply both strategic management and corporate finance disciplines, and 
to further sharpen their understanding of strategic decision making in respect to business models, 
and its impact on a company’s financial performance. 
 
Teaching Approach 
The length of the class should be 1 hour and 30 minutes. The first hour is devoted to case 
conversation, whereas the last 30 minutes are to Q&A. Students will give considerable attention 
to the financial information provided in the exhibits in addition to the strategic issues raised. 
 
Structure of Teaching Note 
 
I. Introduction of RI’s business model 
 Question 1: Key characteristics; 
 Question 2: Development over time; and 
 Question 3: Company Building and Investments. 
II. Financial assessment of the Value crystallization of RI’s business model 
 Question 4: Value crystallization; 
 Question 5a: Value crystallization of best practice examples; and 
 Question 5b: Impact of value crystallization. 
 Question 5c: Evaluation from investors’ point of view 
III. Strategic and financial evaluation of RI’s business model (Question 6) 
IV. Outlook and potential adaptations of RI’s business model (Question 7) 
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Question 1: Key characteristics of RI ’s business model 
In which competitive environment does RI operate? What is the foundation of RI’s superior 
business model? 
	
Working Time: 15 minutes 
Students recap the strengths of RI’s business model and consider Case Study: p. 8ff. and Figure 3.  
 
In general, students may find it hard to determine a single competitive environment because of 
RI´s unique business model, which comprises a large amount of Technology related investments 
and company-building projects. ‘However, unlike e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba or 
Amazon, RI represents a portfolio of investments.’ (Case Study, p. 1). Thus, RI´s competitive 
environment is determined by each portfolio company´s environment, which can be identified 
based on two options: compare the portfolio company to the original company (e.g. Zalando vs. 
Zappos) or to its competitors (Hello Fresh vs. Blue Apron). Referring to RI´s superior business 
model, the Rocket Recipe breaks down the single steps (Case Study, p. 8 following pages (ff.)). 
 
RI’s superior business model is based on the following key success factors (Table 2): 
 Selecting attractive investment opportunities: Marketplaces, E-Commerce and FinTech; 
 Minimizing investment risk by copying already proven business models; 
 Business model adaptation by deep localization: Companies’ core functions such as 
logistics, HR, Finance are sourced locally for optimizing Customer Lifetime Value (CLV) 
and Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC); 
 Centralized hub of company-building and technology knowledge; 
 Execution speed for implementing business models leads to first mover advantages, 
establishing entry barriers, brand building, and economies of scale and scope. 
 Samwer brothers’ entrepreneurial experience, established Tech network and successful 
track record of more than 250 investments; 
 High cash balance: Complementary M&A activities feasible; and 
 Flexibility of business model: RI is able to invest in attractive investment opportunities 
ranging from small (< €100m) to big-tickets (> €1,000m). 
 
Conclusion: 
RI established a unique business model as an operating platform company, comprising company-
building and investment activities. As a consequence, RI´s competitive environment is determined 
by each portfolio company´s environment in terms of the original company and competitors. Using 
RI’s IT-infrastructure, centralized entrepreneurial knowledge and experience, RI´s portfolio 
companies are able to grow much faster and efficiently than traditional businesses do. 
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Question 2: Development of RI ’s business model 
Describe RI´s milestones since 2007 and how they impact the main business RI operates in. 
	
Working Time: 15 minutes 
The goal of this question is to raise students´ attention towards RI´s company transformation and 
negative shareholder sentiment questioning RI´s business model’s viability. Students should pay 
special attention to Case Study: p. 4ff., 21 and Figure 1.  
 
After its foundation in 2007, RI rapidly grew from a technology start up to an operating platform, 
providing its companies with a platform to succeed in emerging markets. Undoubtedly, the largest 
milestones for RI have been both Zalando’s and RI’s IPO in 2014. In the following years, RI 
changed its strategic orientation by raising the RICP fund in 2016, which led to its transformation 
into a listed venture capital fund: ‘Rocket isn’t just building up young companies any more, it’s 




Most important milestones: 
 2008 - 2013: Successful company exits: MyCityDeal ($126m) and Bigpoint (€70m);  
 2014: Zalando IPO with a Market capitalization of €5.3bn; 
 2014: RI IPO with a Market capitalization of €7.9bn; and 
 2016: RICP: Fundraising of $1.0bn of Assets under Management.  
Strategic rationale: 
These milestones provided RI with proceeds that were used to re-invest in the Rocket Recipe 
for further investments and company-building projects. Particularly, the IPO of Zalando and RI, 
and raised funds from the RICP fund, made a significant contribution in this respect. However, 
the strategic shift towards a venture capital fund caused negative shareholder sentiment. 
 
Conclusion: 
Since 2007, RI transformed from a technology start up into Europe’s largest technology company 
in 2014, and consequently to Europe’s largest Internet venture capital fundraiser in 2016. 
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Question 3: Company building and investments as part of RI ’s business model 
The case study introduces the unicorns: Delivery Hero, Hello Fresh and Zalando. Which parallels 
and differences exist between their development in terms of rocket recipe, milestones, target 
market, positioning, and value crystallization? 
	
Working Time: 15 minutes 
This question highlights the two different approaches of RI’s business model: Company building 
and investing. Students should understand that both approaches are applied to all portfolio 
companies with a common goal, that is, to rapidly scale companies into market leading positions. 
Students should pay special attention to Case Study: p. 6, 11ff.  
 
Delivery Hero, Hello Fresh and Zalando are unicorns and ranked in RI’s proven winners segment, 
which relies on copying and adapting the already proven business model. All three companies 
experienced a history of high growth and rapid scaling of their operations. Although, the three 
unicorns went through RI’s Rocket Recipe, they either did so through the company-building or 
the investment process. Further differences occur from the business models, geographical scope, 
scope of expansion, and duration of break-even, as detailed below. 
 
Parallels: 
 Rocket Recipe: Focus on strong revenue growth; 
 Milestones: From market leaders to technology unicorns; and 
 Value crystallization: Most likely by IPO. 
 
Differences: 
 Rocket Recipe: Company Building (Rocket Recipe Ingredient #1 to #7: e.g. Hello Fresh and 
Zalando) vs. Investment (Rocket Recipe Ingredient #3 to #7: e.g. Delivery Hero); 
 Segment: Marketplaces (Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh) vs. E-Commerce (Zalando); 
 Timing of break-even: Marketplaces (5 - 7 years) vs. E-Commerce (6 - 9 years); 
 Positioning:  
o Delivery Hero being market leader in 35 out of 40 markets;  
o Hello Fresh being market leader in seven out of nine markets; and 
o Zalando being Europe’s largest online fashion retailer. 
 
Conclusion: 
Comparing the three unicorns, the Rocket Recipe generates parallels and differences at the same 
time, emphasizing the flexibility and uniqueness of the business model. The reason lies in the 
Rocket Recipe’s two-way approach of company-building and investments. 
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Question 4: Value crystallization of RI ’s business model 
Discuss 3 general (dis)advantages of an IPO and RI’s strategic rationale for a unicorn’s IPO. 
	
Working Time: 15 minutes 
Students should start to develop an understanding of IPOs in general and connect these ideas to 
RI. For RI, IPOs are of utmost importance for continuing its business model, as they are the means 
to both crystallize value and re-invest the IPO proceeds in existing or future projects. Students 
should pay special attention to Case Study: p. 6 following page (f.), 11ff. 
 
In general, an IPO transforms a private company into a public company. In the following, the 
most common advantages and disadvantages of an IPO are presented. 
 
IPO advantages: 
1. Greater access to funds; 
2. Higher valuation and liquidity: Illiquidity discount for private companies is eliminated; 
3. Liquid currency for acquisitions: Facilitation of future acquisitions; 
4. Exit strategy: Liquidity for investors, owners and shareholders; and 
5. Enhances company’s prestige, brand image, public profile and credibility. 
 
IPO disadvantages: 
1. High costs: Investment banks, lawyers and accountants have to be paid; 
2. Potential loss of control and privacy: Need to reveal highly sensitive information in public 
reports; 
3. ‘IPO Underpricing’: At closing of first trading day, public companies tend to have positive 
returns, leading to the assumption that ‘money was left on the table’; 
4. Limited window of opportunity to access IPO markets; and 
5. Shareholders’ earnings expectations can create pressure on management.  
 
RI’s strategic rationale of the IPO, is to ‘finance its future growth through the launch of new 
businesses and provide further equity capital to its network of companies’ (Case Study, p. 7). 
 
Conclusion: 
With an IPO, private companies get greater access to funds and liquidity, which translates into 
more operational and financial flexibility, but also more regulation, reporting and pressure for 
generating shareholder value. For RI, IPOs of unicorns are a means of value crystallization, in 
order to use the generated cash flows to fund new company-buildings, new investments or 
dividends and share buybacks. 
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Question 5a: Value crystallization of best practice examples of RI ’s business model 
Currently, Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh are unprofitable, but deliver strong sales growth. 
Do you think these companies are reasonable IPO candidates? Please evaluate them from a 
qualitative and quantitative point of view. 
	   
Working Time 25 minutes 
Students should understand, what shareholders appreciate most when assessing public companies, 
and are supposed to build their answers on the successful IPOs of RI and Zalando, and the failed 
IPO of Hello Fresh. Potential pitfalls may arise from considering profitability ratios only. Students 
should pay special attention to Case Study: p. 8f., 15 and Exhibit 6, 7, 9. 
 
There is no simple formula to follow when deciding which company makes a good IPO candidate. 
However, investors want to invest their money into businesses that can really scale up and deliver 
outsized returns. Analyzing quantitative and qualitative characteristics (Case Study, p. 6), Delivery 





Reasonable IPO candidates are companies with historic revenue growth, outperformance of peers 
and an understandable business model with a compelling equity story. Considering the qualitative/ 
quantitative characteristics, Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh seem reasonable IPO candidates.  
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Question 5b: Value crystallization’s impact on RI ’s business model 
Do the potential IPOs of Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh contribute to RI’s value crystallization? 
Please explain your reasoning by calculating RI’s share in potential IPO proceeds. 
	
Working Time: 15 minutes 
Students should be able to qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the implications of potential 
Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh IPOs for RI. Furthermore, an understanding of using multiples of 
comparable companies should make students feel more comfortable in quantitatively assessing 
companies. Student should pay special attention to Case Study: Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6. 
 
In general, RI crystallizes value, when its proven winners are either sold to larger competitors 
or transformed from private to public companies by an IPO. Considering the potential IPOs 
of Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh, RI would be able to sell its stake in these companies (usually 
after a lock-up period of 180 days after IPO). RI’s respective IPO proceeds are calculated pro rata, 
meaning that the market capitalization of both companies will be multiplied with RI’s share 
holdings in these companies.  
 
RI’s IPO proceeds for Delivery Hero: €1.2bn (= 11.85 * €384m * 0.26) 
 RI’s Economic Ownership: 26% 
 P/S (LTM) = 11.85x  
 Delivery Hero Sales (LTM): €384m 
 Market capitalization: approx. €4.5bn 
 
RI’s IPO proceeds for Hello Fresh: €0.8bn (= 3.35 * €435m * 0.53) 
 RI’s Economic Ownership: 53% 
 P/S = 3.35x 
 Hello Fresh Sales: €435m 
 Market capitalization: approx. €1.5bn 
 
Conclusion: 
Going public with Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh, RI could generate PO proceeds of roughly 
€2.0bn. By doing so, RI successfully complies with the approach of value crystallization.  
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Question 5c: Evaluation of RI ’s business model from investors’ point of view 
Imagine that the recommended IPOs were successfully executed and fairly stable in market 
price. Evaluating RI´s business model, please compare the sum of RI’s cash (equivalents) and 
RI´s potential IPO proceeds (of Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh) with RI’s current market 
capitalization. Is there a discrepancy from an investor’s point of view? If so, please explain. 
	
Working Time: 15 minutes 
After qualitatively analyzing the negative sentiment of RI’s shareholders, students are supposed to 
complement this analysis with a quantitative perspective. By doing so, they should understand how 
RI´s non-transparent business model may have hampered RI´s perception and financial evaluation. 
Students should pay special attention to Case Study: p.16. 
 
On 30th June 2017, RI has roughly accumulated €1.6bn in net cash (equivalents) and its proven 
winners additional €0.8bn, leading to RI’s overall gross cash balance of €2.4bn (Case Study: p. 
16). This number combined with the theoretical IPO proceeds of RI in Delivery Hero (€1.2bn) 
and Hello Fresh (€0.8bn) by far exceed RI’s current market capitalization of €3.6bn, without 
even considering further proven winners’ value. As a result, RI trades at a massive discount 
(€3.6bn < €4.4bn).  
 
There are several reasons for explaining this imbalance between market capitalization and RI’s 
gross cash balance and IPO proceeds: 
 Non-transparent valuation methodology: RI applies Last Portfolio Values (LPV) instead 
of commonly used valuation metrics; 
 Restrictive payout policy: No dividends and no share buybacks; 
 Negative investor sentiment: Doubts about RI’s business model and RI’s ability to achieve 
break-even on a group level; and 
 Negative momentum: High short interest on RI and exit of long-term investor Kinnevik. 
 
Conclusion: 
RI is trading at a massive discount because investors developed a negative sentiment towards RI´s 
business model due to its little earnings as well as questionable future prospects. 
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Question 6: Strategic and financial evaluation of RI ’s business model  
Considering investors´ negative sentiment, could the two potential IPOs lead to a positive long-
term investor perception regarding RI´s business model? Please explain your answer and present 
solutions on how to improve investors’ sentiment in the future.  
	
Working Time: 20 minutes 
Students should view the big picture building on the answers of Question 1-5 and should be able 
to identify both the positive short-term effects of the potential IPO’s on RI’s performance, and the  
issue of consistently satisfying its shareholders. Students should pay special attention to Case 
Study Page 17ff. and Exhibit 9. 
 
 ‘It’s just incredibly hard for investors to judge a group with such a diverse portfolio of early-
stage companies’ (Case Study, p. 18). Keeping this in mind, the negative investor sentiment 
regarding RI’s business model is multifaceted and can be best described by: 
 Decreasing share price since 2014 by more than -50%; 
 Thin pipeline of new company-building projects; 
 Increasing net loss since 2015; and 
 Restrictive payout policy (no dividends or share buybacks). 
 
The two potential IPOs of Delivery Hero and Hello Fresh would certainly improve investors’ 
sentiment in the short-term. However, to restore investors’ confidence also in the long-term, 
investors’ patience has to be rewarded until further proven winners’ value can be crystallized. In 
doing so, RI should focus on implementing the following actions: 
 Less restrictive payout policy: 
o Regularly paying dividends; and/or 
o Introducing share buyback program (typically increasing share price); 
 Filling pipeline with more prosperous company-building and investment projects to ensure 
more regular value crystallization; and 
 Using RI’s large cash pile for further investments in attractive companies. 
Conclusion: 
Considering RI´s negative shareholder value, the two potential IPOs are a means to turn investor 
perceptions positively in the short-term. For the mid-term, however, a less restrictive payout policy 
is necessary to reward investors’ patience, e.g. paying dividends. A filled pipeline with prosperous 
company-building and investment projects, which can be backed by RI’s large cash pile, is a 
prerequisite to generate more recurring cash flows in the long-term. 
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Question 7: Outlook and potential adaptations of RI ’s business model 
Imagine you are in Oliver Samwer´s shoes and an angry investor approaches you with the 
following question during the annual meeting: ‘Why should I hold or even increase my 
investment in RI?’  What would you tell him? Please state specific reasons and focus on the 
future strategic development to persuade the shareholder. 
	
Working Time: 25 minutes 
Students should summarize their key findings of the Case Study and should present precise actions 
to adapt and align RI’s business model with shareholders’ interests.  
 
‘I take your complaint very seriously. Since the IPO in 2014, RI has done very well from an 
operational point of view. We made tremendous progress in terms of bringing our proven winners 
on the path of profitable growth. We are on track regarding our strategic goals, to go public with 
at least one of our unicorns in 2017. Unfortunately, in RI’s share price, this progress is not yet 
reflected. I can ensure you that we work very hard to improve this as soon as possible.  
 
However, it takes time to communicate to the markets that we learned from mistakes and that we 
will adapt our current business model. We are currently shifting our company-building focus more 
towards an investment focus. Thus, we will be able to pay out more to our shareholders, as we will 
be able to generate more regularly occurring earnings not only in early stage, but also in grown 
companies. Also, we currently think about introducing a share buyback program to reward RI’s 
loyal shareholders, like you, for their patience. We estimate to receive significant IPO proceeds 
from Delivery Hero, Hello Fresh and further companies this year. With these proceeds and the 
RICP fund, we will make sure that we re-invest our cash holdings in large and attractive 
investment opportunities to be able to realize large returns, that can be given back to you and 
other shareholders. 
 
Our operations do work – so at RI, we are currently in a transition phase to become a more 
diversified investment company. We, as the management board, need a little bit more time to get 
this process done and need to better communicate the shift of our business model. I start with it 
today with you and I hope, that I can count on you in this important stage of our company history’ 
 
Conclusion: 
Considering negative market sentiment reflected in RI´s low share price, RI acknowledges 
investors´ increasing demand for rewards by participating in prosperous future investments.  
  
Rocket Internet Case Study I Teaching Not 
 
32 






Oliver Samwer, Rocket Internet CEO: ‘We are 
proud of Delivery Hero’s and Hello Fresh’s 
achievements and would like to congratulate 
the teams on their success. Rocket Internet’s 
investments in the Food & Grocery sector in 
2014 and 2015 have proven to be a successful 
investment focus. We will continue to incubate 
and invest in promising Internet business 
models and strive to continue to identify 
attractive investment opportunities.




IPO of Delivery Hero in June 2017 (Pre exercise of Greenshoe option) 
  IPO valuation: €4.9bn 
  RI IPO proceeds: €425m, RI shareholding: 13% 
  Share price development since IPO: +39.3% (as of 4 December 2017) 
 
 
IIPO of Hello Fresh in November 2017 (Pre exercise of Greenshoe option) 
  IPO valuation: €1.6bn 
  RI IPO proceeds: €277m, RI shareholding: 44% 
  Share price development since IPO: -6.7% (as of 4 December 2017) 
 
Further developments since June 2017: 
	
 
 Sale of 13% stake in Delivery Hero for €660m 
 Continued implementation of adjusted business model: 
o Less investment restrictions in terms of company’s size, stage and regional scope; 
 Improved Payout policy: Share buyback program with a volume of up to €100m launched 
in August 2017, according to RI no dividends will be paid; 
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 Share price volatile, but stabilized in €19 to €22/share range 
 Financial improvement within portfolio companies: 9M 2017 vs. 9M 2016 
o Aggregate revenue grew by 28% to €1.85bn  
o Aggregate adj. EBITDA margin improved from -19% to -12%  
 Increased gross cash balance (incl. portfolio companies): €2.9bn (Excl. proceeds of 
€660m from sale of 13% stake in Delivery Hero) 
 Market capitalization: €3.6bn (as of 30 September 2017) 
 
Conclusion: 
Although RI managed to achieve significant value crystallization (e.g. IPOs of Delivery Hero, 
Hello Fresh and sale of Delivery Hero stake), launched a share buyback program, and established 
financial improvements of its portfolio companies, RI’s share price has only stabilized. 
Considering that RI’s gross cash balance of €3.6bn (incl. Delivery Hero proceeds of €660m) 
roughly equals RI’s market capitalization as of 30 September 2017, this basically means that RI’s 
privately held portfolio companies are valued as worthless.  
 
Bottom line, RI’s key issue remains to align strategic and financial aspects. To be successful 
in the long-term, RI continuously re-invents its business model. However, RI has painfully 
experienced, that this business model shift needs to be aligned with shareholders’ interest, 
that is shareholder value. The prerequisite for generating shareholder value is that RI 
regularly crystallizes value, which can be used to reward investors patience in form of share 
buybacks and/or dividends. 
 
